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Labor market regulations are introduced with the stated objective of improving workers' welfare.
Mandated benefits and social security programs improve workers' income security in case of sickness,
work accidents and old age. Job security provisions are designed to reduce a worker's odds of losing her
job and her means of living. But, as is often true in economics, benefits usually come at a cost: mandated
benefits may reduce employment; job security provisions may protect some workers at the expense of
others.
This paper gathers evidence from existing and new sources of information on the costs of job
security policies. Latin America has experienced a wide range of labor market policies that provide natural
experiments with which to evaluate the impact of these polices. Our evidence challenges the prevailing
view (see e.g. Abraham and T4ouseman (1994), Blank and Freeman (1994), Freeman (2000) and the papers
he cites) that labor market regulations do not affect employment and have minimal costs. We establish that
job security policies have a substantial impact on the level and the distribution of employment in Latin
America. The evidence for their effect on unemployment is much weaker but there are good conceptual
reasons why this should be so.
Our focus on the cost side does not imply we believe the benefits of labor policies for protected
workers are small or irrelevant. While the benefits to recipients are well-documented, the costs are often
unintended and less well understood. Thus, while the evidence suggests that regulations promoting job
security reduce covered workers exit rates out of employment, it also indicates that demand curves are
downward sloping, that regulation reduces aggregate employment and that the greatest adverse impact of
regulation is on youth and groups marginal to the workforce. Insiders and entrenched workers gain from
regulation but outsiders suffer. As a consequence, job security regulations reduce employment and promote
inequality across workers.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes and quantifies job security regulations
in Latin America and the Caribbean. In section 3, we summarize the existing evidence on the impact ofjob
security provisions on employment, unemployment and turnover rates in Latin America. Section 4 presents
new evidence. In section 5 we summarize the paper and present our conclusions.
22. Job Security Regulation in Latin America and the Caribbean
In this paper, we define job security legislation (JS) to include all those provisions that increase the
cost of dismissing a worker. In this section, we quantify the costs of abiding by the legislation, in terms of
wages, in order to address three questions: (1) Row high are the implied costs of JS provisions in Latin
America and the Caribbean? (2) Within the region, which countries have costlier termination provisions
and which are more deregulated? (3) Row do Latin American and Caribbean countries compare with
industrial countries in terms of JS legislation?
In Latin An-ierican countries, labor codes based on the civil law system regulate the permissible
types, durations and the conditions for termination of labor contracts. In contrast, most Caribbean countries
are based on the common law system so the law enforces a contract with which both parties privately agree.
As a consequence, in some countries there is not a specific body of law regulating employer-employee
relationships, while in others some aspects are regulated while others are left to the courts.
In Latin America, labor codes favor full-time indefinite employment over part-time, fixed-term or
temporary contracts. These types of contracts not only differ in the length of the employment relationship
but also in the conditions for termination. While indefinite contracts carry severance pay obligations,
temporary contracts can be terminated at no cost provided that the duration of the contract has expired. In
contrast, most Caribbean countries do not regulate the range of admissible contracts. Instead, such
decisions are left to the parties involved in collective bargaining.
There are important differences as well in the conditions for termination of contracts. In Latin
America, the termination of a contract is severely restricted. Thus, labor codes mandate a minimum
advance notice period prior to termination, determine which causes are considered "just" or "unjust" causes
for dismissal, and establish compensation to be awarded to workers for each possible cause of termination.
In some countries, firms must also request permission to dismiss more than a certain fraction of their labor
force. Finally, some countries allow the reinstatement of a worker to her post if the dismissal is found to be
"unjustified" by the courts, although, this provision has been eliminated in many countries. In contrast, in
3some of the Caribbean countries, advance notice and severance pay are negotiated as part of collective
agreements, so there are no specific laws regulating such provisions.
Termination laws (or collective agreements) require firms to incur four types of costs: advance
notification, compensation for dismissal, seniority premium for dismissed workers and foregone wages
during any trial in which the worker contests dismissal. The period of advance notification should be
included in the computation of costs because, in general, the various laws typically allow firms to choose
between providing advance notice or paying a compensation equivalent to the wage corresponding to that
period. Moreover, since productivity can decline substantially after notice, advance notification should be
considered as a part of the dismissal cost even when firms choose to notifj workers in advance. Advance
notification periods vary from country to country, ranging from zero in Nicaragua, Guatemala, Pen and
Uruguay to three months in Bolivia, Haiti and Venezuela for workers with more than 10 years at a firm
(See Table l.A in the Appendix).
The second component of dismissal cost is compensation for unjustified dismissal. Since in most
Latin American countries the economic difficulties of a firm are not considered a just cause for dismissal,
any labor force reductions fall in this category. The formula for calculating this compensation is based on
multiples of the most recent wage and the years of service. In contrast, in the Caribbean, under union
agreements, severance pay is only awarded to a worker in the case that a firm needs to reduce the work
force for lack of work or technological change. In most other cases, employment at will is still the norm
provided that the firm gives reasonable advance notice to a worker. Finally, in Belize, Bolivia, Chile and
Nicaragua, the law mandates compensation to the worker in case of a voluntary quit2.
In some countries, employers are required to make an additional payment, known as a seniority
premium, upon termination of the work relationship regardless of the cause or party initiating the
termination. In Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, Pen, and Venezuela, this benefit is available to the worker
both in the case of unjustified dismissal and in the case of a voluntary quit. If a worker quits, she obtains
this payment, whereas if the worker is dismissed she obtains this payment plus the compensation for
dismissal. In Brazil, this additional payment is only available in the case of unjust dismissal, and if the
worker quits, she receives no pay. In all the above-mentioned countries, firms deposit a certain fraction of
2111Chile,compensation in case of a quit only occurs after the 7thyearof service and if the worker chooses to set up an account.
4workers' monthly wages in an individual trust fund in order to provide for this payment.3 In Ecuador,
Colombia, Brazil and Peru, the worker gains access to the principal plus a yield.4 In Panama and
Venezuela, the seniority premium is fixed in terms of multiples of monthly wages and the amount accrued
in the fund (Panama) or the fund plus a certain yield (Venezuela) pays for the seniority premium. However,
the firm is responsible for covering the difference between the required seniority premium and the amount
accumulated in the seniority premium fund.
Finally, in some countries, firms are also required to pay a worker's foregone wages during the
period of any legal process if a worker brings an action against the firm. This provision increases the
overall cost of termination by either increasing the overall compensation due and/or reducing workers'
incentives to settle out of court.5
During the nineties, seven countries (Colombia, Guyana, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru,
and Venezuela) reformed their labor codes in order to reduce the cost of dismissing a worker. Not all labor
reforms reduced JS, however. In Chile (1991) and in Dominican Republic (1992), the amount that a firm
has to pay upon dismissal of a worker increased considerably during the nineties.
In an attempt to quantify all of these provisions we construct an index of JS encompassing LAC
and industrial countries. There have been previous attempts to construct such types of measures. Bertola
(1990), Grubbs and Wells (1993) and the OECD (1993, 1999) constructed ordinal measures of JS for
industrial countries whereas Marquéz (1998) constructed ordinal measures of job security for a sample of
industrial and LAC countries. Also, Lazear (1990) quantified firing costs as the amount (in multiples of
monthly wages) owed to a worker if she is dismissed after 10 years of service. These measures, however,
are unlikely to accurately reflect the magnitude of dismissal costs.
On the one hand, ordinal measures can only state that one country is more regulated than another,
but cannot measure how much more regulated it is. On the other hand, JS tends to increase in tenure, which
implies that measures conditional on certain level of tenure only measure a given point in the severance-
tenure schedule. To address these shortcomings, we construct an alternative cardinal measure of firing
costs that summarizes the entire tenure-severance pay profile using a common set of dismissal probabilities
3jn Brazil, the fund is called FGTS, in Peru, CTS, in Colombia, Fondo tie Cesantia and in Panama, Fondo de Antiguedad.
In Brazil a worker gets access to this fund only if she is dismissed.
5across countries. This measure computes the expected future cost, at the time a worker is hired, of
dismissing her in the future due to unfavorable economic conditions.6 The index is constructed to include
only firing costs that affect firm's decisions at the margin and therefore it does not include the full cost of
regulation on labor demand. It includes the cost of providing statutory advance notice and severance pay
conditional on each possible level of tenure that a worker can attain in the future.
The JS index does not include the seniority premium as part of cost because, in most countries,
provisions for that payment are regularly deposited in a fund. Thus, because deposits are not directly made
conditional on a dismissal they are not likely to alter firing decisions. Rather they should be treated as other
labor costs incurred by the firm that do not affect firing decisions and are not included in our index.
However, they clearly affect the cost of labor to the firm. The index also does not include the cost derived
from foregone wages during trial. Although this component may be a substantial share of the total of cost
of dismissal, we do not include it in our index because the information on this cost is not available. Thus
we cannot estimate the full cost of resolution of legal costs arising from challenges to dismissals through
the courts.
Our measure of JS thus reflects the marginal costs of dismissing full-time indefinite workers.
However, this measure does not capture the effects of recent reforms that have made temporary and fixed-
term contracts widely available in countries like Argentina and Pen. To the extent that fixed-term and
indefinite contracts are not perfect substitutes—since temporary workers may be less productive (see the
evidence in Aguirragabiria and Borganso, 2000)--our index still captures the marginal cost of firing a
tenured worker. However, firms may be at the margin of firing temporary workers and so our index
overstates the true marginal cost. Additional information regarding the construction of this index can be
found in the Appendix. This measure will be used in Section 3 to quantify the impact of JS on different
employment and unemployment measures in a sample of OECD and LAC countries.
Graph 1 displays the costs of advance notice and compulsory severance pay in Latin American
and the Caribbean for 1990 and 1999 as summarized by our index. This graph reveals that even after many
countries have reduced dismissal costs during the nineties, the average cost of dismissing a worker is still
Another component of dismissal costs that can be quite important in some countries is given by the specific regulations that govern
collective dismissals. Information on those regulations is not available for most countries of LAC and therefore we did not include
them in our discussion or measurements.
6higher in Latin America than in our sample of industrial countries. In comparison, the countries of the
Caribbean basin exhibit much lower dismissal costs.
Table 1: Job Security Index across Latin America, the Caribbean and OECD countries.
End of the nineties




United States 0.000 0.000 1
NewZealand 0.221 1.844 2
Australia 0.443 3.696 3
Canada 0.553 4.610 4
Norway 0.912 7.599 5
Germany 1.140 9.498 6
France 1.143 9.526 7
Poland 1.219 10.160 8
Switzerland 1.247 10.395 9
United Kingdom 1.457 12.144 10
Belgium 1.729 14.407 11
Austria 1.784 14.864 12
Brazil 1.785 14.871 13
Greece 1.804 15.034 14
Guyana 1.890 15.750 15
Jamaica 1.920 16.003 16
Paraguay 2.168 18.068 17
Uruguay 2.232 18.599 18
Trinidad&Tobago 2.548 21.230 19
Nicaragua 2.563 21.358 20
Panama 2.718 22.652 21
Dominican Republic 2.814 23.454 22
Venezuela 2.955 24.625 23
Argentina 2.977 24.808 24
Costa Rica 3.12 1 26.005 25
Mexico 3.126 26.050 26
ElSalvador 3.134 26.116 27
Spain 3.156 26.300 28
Chile 3.380 28.164 29
Colombia 3.493 29.108 30
Honduras 3.530 29.418 31
Peru 3.796 31.632 32
Turkey 3.973 33.110 33
Ecuador 4.035 33.621 34
Portugal 4.166 34.720 35
Bolivia 4.756 39.637 36
Source: Authors' computations (See Appendix)
6Thismeasure is based on the index developed in Pages and Montenegro (1999)
7Looking at the individual countries, it may be surprising that countries like Argentina or Mexico
exhibit lower JS than Chile, a country traditionally considered as having a more flexible labor market. This
divergence is caused by the fact that our index only measures one component of labor market rigidities. So
while Argentina and Mexico have stronger unions than Chile, and therefore are likely to have higher wage
rigidity, Chile has higher individual job security provisions. Our index, also discounts penalties that arise
far in the future, and so the fact that labor codes in Chile and other countries establish an upper limit in
payments is discounted in our measure.
Graph 1 shows that four countries in Latin America (Nicaragua, Venezuela, Panama and Pen)
undertook substantive reforms in their labor codes. Nicaragua and Venezuela reduced the expected
dismissal cost by more than three monthly wages, while Panama and Pen reduced it between one and one
and half monthly wages. However, Table 1 also makes clear that even after a decade of substantial
deregulation, Latin American countries remain at the top of the JS list, with levels of regulation similar to
or higher than those existing in the highly regulated South of Europe. We next consider quantitative
estimates of the impact ofjob security regulations.
3. The impact of job security regulations
The goal of this section is to quantify the impact of job security regulations on employment and
turnover rates. The importance of dismissal costs in Latin America is clear in Graph 1. It is thus important
to assess the impact, if any, that such policies have on the labor market.
3.1 Theoretical discussion
To analyze the impact ofjob security provisions requires a more complex framework that encompasses
dynamic decisions of firms. Bertola (1990) develops a dynamic partial-equilibrium model to assess how a
firm's firing and hiring decisions are affected by dismissal costs. In the face of a given shock, the optimal
employment policy of a firm involves one of three state-contingent responses: (i) dismissing workers, (ii)
hiring workers and (iii) doing nothing, in which case employment in that firm does not change. How are
these decisions altered by firing costs? In the face of a negative shock and declining marginal value of
8labor, a firm may want to dismiss some workers, but it has to pay a mandatory dismissal cost. This cost has
the effect of discouraging firms from adjusting their labor force, resulting in fewer dismissals than in the
absence of such costs. Conversely, in the face of a positive shock firms may want to hire additional workers
but will take into account that some workers may have to be fired in the future if demand turns down, and
this is costly. This prospective cost acts as a hiring cost, effectively reducing creation of new jobs in good
states. The net result is lower employment rates in expansions, higher employment rates in recessions and
lower turnover rates as firms hire and fire fewer workers than they would in the absence of these costs.
Bertola's model predicts a decline in employment variability associated with firing costs but the
implication of his model for average employment is ambiguous. In particular, whether average employment
rates increase or decline as a result of firing costs depends on whether the decline in hiring rates more than
compensates the reduction in firings. Indeed, simulations reported in Bertola (1990) and Bentolila and
Bertola (1990) suggest that average employment (in a given firm) is likely to increase when firing costs
increase. These results, however, are quite sensitive to different assumptions about the persistence of
shocks, the elasticity of the labor demand, the magnitude of the discount rate, and the functional form of the
production function. Thus, less persistent shocks and lower discount rates are associated with larger
negative effects of JS on employment because both factors reduce hiring relative to firing (Bentolila and
Saint Paul, 1994). Furthermore, a higher elasticity of the demand for goods implies a larger negative effect
of job security on employment rates (Risager & Sorensen, 1997). In addition, when investment decisions
are also considered, firing costs lower profits and discourage investment, increasing the likelihood that
firing costs reduce the demand for labor (Bertola, 1991).
The results just reported analyze employment rates in one firm without considering the impact of
firing costs on the extensive margin, that is, on how firing costs affect the creation and destruction of firms.
Flopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) develop a general equilibrium model based on the U.S. economy that
accounts for entry and exit of firms. In their model, the partial equilibrium framework of Bertola (1990) is
embedded in a general equilibrium framework in which jobs and firms are created and destroyed in every
period in response to firm-specific shocks. In the context of their model, they find that increasing firing
costs in the U.S. would lead to an increase in the average employment of existing firms as a consequence of
the reduction in firings. However, they also find that such a policy would result in lower firm entry, and
9lower job creation in newly created firms. For the parameter values they consider, these two last effects
offset the increase in employment in existing firms resulting in a reduction of overall employment rates.
Job security may also affect employment through its effect on wages. The insider/outsider
literature emphasizes that job security provisions increase the insider power of incumbent workers. This
effect results in higher wages for insiders and lower overall employment rates (Lindbeck and Snower,
1987b). Caballero and T4ammour (1997) consider a model in which job security provisions increase the
appropriability of capital by labor by increasing capital specifity. That is, a larger part of the capital
invested becomes relationship specific and becomes lost if capital separates from labor. While in the short-
run, higher firing costs allow labor to extract higher rents from capital, in the long-run firms invest in less
labor intensive technologies, reducing employment demand.
Some recent literature has also emphasized the possible impact of job security regulations on the
composition of employment. Kugler (2000) proposes a model in which job security regulations provide
incentives for high turnover firms to operate in the informal sector. This decision entails producing at a
small, less efficient scale in order to remain inconspicuous to tax and labor authorities. In this framework,
high job security is likely to increase informality rates. Pages and Montenegro (1999) develop a model in
which JS related to tenure biases employment against young workers and in favor of older ones. As
severance pay increases with tenure, and tenure tends to increase with age, older workers become more
costly to dismiss than younger ones. If wages do not adjust appropriately, negative shocks result in a
disproportionate share of layoffs among young workers. Therefore, job security based on tenure results in
lower employment rates for the young, relative to older workers, because it reduces hiring and increases
firings for young workers.
We conclude that higher JS provisions reduce turnover rates and bias the composition of
employment against young workers and against employment in the formal sector. The implications for
average employment in the economy at large are, however, somewhat less conclusive since they can
depend on specific configurations of parameters for the economy. To complicate matters further, by the
Coase theorem the impact of job security could be completely "undone" with a properly designed labor
contract provided that there are no restrictions on transactions between workers and firms. (Lazear, 1990).
Thus, in a world without transactions costs, wages adjust to offset the possible negative impact highlighted
10in the previous discussion. Given the ambiguity of theoretical models, the magnitude and direction of the
impact ofjob security on employment has to be resolved empirically. In the following two subsections, we
discuss existing evidence relating JS to labor market outcomes and present some new evidence of our own.
3.2. Empirical Evidence for Latin America and the Caribbean
Despite the existence of strict job security regulation in most of the countries of the region,
research assessing its impact has been extremely scarce. Fortunately, a recent series of empirical studies
assess the impact of job security regulation on employment and turnover rates in Latin America and the
Caribbean providing the first systematic evidence of its impact on the labor market.7 Several studies assess
the impact of job security on turnover rates in the labor market. Changes in turnover are measured using
changes in the duration of jobs (tenure), the duration of unemployment and the exit rates out of
employment and unemployment.8 Higher employment exit rates indicate more layoffs (or more quits),
while higher exit rates out of unemployment and into formal jobs indicate higher job creation in the formal
sector. Other studies examine the impact of job security on employment rates. The definition of
employment changes depending on the data considered. In general, most studies focus on employment in
large firms, although some also examine more aggregated measures of employment. In addition, a small
group of studies also examines the impact of job security on the composition of employment (See Table 2
for an overview of the empirical evidence for Latin America and the Caribbean).
A. Turnover Rates
The strongest evidence is on the impact of job security on turnover. As predicted by most
theoretical models, the empirical evidence confirms that less stringent job security is associated with higher
turnover in the labor market. Kugler (2000) analyzes the impact of the 1990 labor market reforms in
Colombia. She finds that a reduction in job security is associated with a decline in average tenure and an
increase in employment exit rates.9 This decline is significantly larger in the formal sector that is covered
by the regulations than in the uncovered or informal sector. In addition, the increase is larger in large firms
Most of these projects were developed under the 1DB research network project "Labor Market Legislation and Employment in Latin
America" coordinated by J. Heckman and C. Pages.
These studies estimate hazard rates. The hazard rate is defined as the probability that a given spell of employment or unemployment
ends in a given period conditional on having lasted a given period of time (e.g., one month, one year).
11and imprecisely determined in the smallest ones. Her results shows similar patterns within tradable and
non-tradable sectors, providing a clear indication that the decline in tenure cannot be attributed to
contemporary trade reforms. The increasing use of temporary contracts explains only part of the increase in
formal sector turnover rates since job stability also declined for workers employed at permanent jobs.1°
Her results also indicate that the increase in turnover is larger for those workers who are more protected by
high levels ofjob security, that is the middle aged and older men employed in large firms.
Kugler also finds a decline in the average duration of unemployment after the reforms. In addition,
exit rates out of unemployment increase more for workers who exit to the formal sector than they do for
those who exit to informal jobs. Her results show quite similar patterns across sectors and a higher exit rate
towards larger firms. Finally, only two-thirds of the increase in the rate of entry into employment can be
attributed to higher use of temporary contracts: the rest is explained by increased exit rates into permanent
jobs in the formal sector. Her results for different workers suggest that the young and women benefit more
from higher exit rates out of unemployment and into the formal sector.
The magnitudes of the estimated effects are not negligible. Kugler estimates that after the reform,
the increase in probability of exiting employment was 6.4% larger for covered workers than for uncovered
ones while the exit rates out of unemployment and into formal jobs increased by 5.9%withrespect to exit
rates to the informal sector.
Saavaedra and Torero (2000) conduct a similar study, evaluating the impact of the 1991 reform in
Pen. Like the reform in Colombia, the 1991 reform considerably reduced the cost of dismissing workers.
Their analysis shows a consistent decline in average job tenure from 1991 onwards suggesting higher
employment exit rates. As in Colombia, the decline is significantly more pronounced in the formal than in
the informal sector, but the magnitude of the fall is larger in Pen. Finally, tenure patterns are also quite
similar across economic sectors, suggesting that these findings cannot be explained by the far-reaching
trade reforms that took place in that country in the early nineties.
Finally, Paes de Barros and Corseuil (2000) provide further evidence from Brazil. Their study
estimates the impact of the 1988 Brazilian Constitutional reform on employment exit rates. In that year, the
In this study tenure is measured by the duration of incomplete spells.
10Inher study, Kugler performs two types of analysis. First, she uses a difference-in-difference estimator to analyze whether changes
in average duration of employment (unemployment) are statistically significantly different in the formal than in the informal sector.
12cost of dismissing workers was raised and therefore a reduction in exit rates would be expected. Their
results confirm that aggregate employment exit rates decline in the formal sector relative to the informal
sector for long employment spells (two years or more).
The credibility of these studies hinges on the validity of the informal sector as a control group
unaffected by the reforms. Kugler (2000) shows that while estimates based on formal-informal sector
comparisons are likely to be biased, under plausible conditions, such comparisons are still valid, at least as
tests of the null hypothesis of no effect of the reform.11 When taken together, these studies provide
consistent evidence that dismissal costs and other employment protection mechanisms reduce worker
reallocation in the labor market. Unfortunately, these studies do not identifj whether increased worker
reallocation is due to increased layoffs, higher quits or a mix of both.
Flopenhayn (2000) provides further evidence of the link between JS and worker turnover rates in
Argentina. In 1991, the government of Argentina deregulated the use of temporary and fixed-term short-
duration contracts. In 1995, additional contractual forms were allowed including a three-month trial period.
Such contracts reduced or eliminated the cost of terminating an employment relationship. Flopenhayn
(2000) finds that after 1995, employment exit rates increase substantially for short employment duration
while they remain constant for long durations. This increase in separations is due to a rise in both quits and
layoffs, although the increase in layoffs is higher.
Summarizing, the evidence provided in this section indicates that JS regulations protect workers
against the risk of losing a job. From this point of view, the recent reforms have reduced the income
security of formerly protected workers. However, the evidence also suggests that stringent JS provisions
reduce exit rates out of unemployment and into formal jobs, thus prolonging the duration of unemployment.
Thus, recent labor market reforms have increased the probability of an unemployed worker finding a job in
the formal sector.
Second, she estimates an exponential duration model to control for changes in demographic covariates, pooling data from before and
after the reform and using interaction terms to assess the differential impact in the formal and in the informal sector.
Kugler shows that lower severance pay may induce high-turnover informal firms to move to the formal sector. Under the
assumption of no overlap in the distribution of turnover between covered and uncovered firms, or that entry to the covered sector
comes from the high-end —or at least from the end that is higher than the formal sector--, this shift results in higher turnover in boththe
13B. Average Employment
The available evidence for LAC countries shows a consistent, although not always statistically
significant, negative impact of JS provisions on average employment rates. Saavedra and Torero (2000)
and Mondino and Montoya (2000) use firm-level panel data to estimate the impact of job security on
employment in Pen and Argentina, respectively. Both studies estimate labor demand equations in which
an explicit measure of job security appears on the right hand side of the equation, and both find evidence
that higher job security levels are associated with lower employment rates. 12 In the case of Peru, Saavedra
and Torero find that the size of the impact of regulations is correlated with the magnitude of the regulations
themselves. Thus, the impact is very high at the beginning of their sample (1987-1990) coinciding with a
period of very high dismissal costs (see Table 1.A). Afterwards, and coinciding with a period of
deregulation, the magnitude of the coefficient declines, only to increase again from 1995 onwards, after a
new increase in dismissal costs. Their estimates for the long-mn elasticities of severance pay are very large
(in absolute value): between 1987 and 1990 a 10% increase in dismissal costs, keeping wages constant, is
estimated to reduce long-mn employment rates by 11%. In subsequent periods, the size of the effect
becomes smaller but is still quite large in magnitude (between 3 and 6%). In Argentina, the estimated long-
run elasticity of a 10% increase in dismissal costs is also between 3 and 6%. 13
formal and the informal sector. Fortunately, higher turnover in the informal sector biases the difference-in-difference estimator
downwards. Therefore, a positive estimate still provides substantial evidence of increased turnover in the formal sector.
12 The data for the Peruvian studycovers firms with more than 10 employees in all sectors of the economy. The Argentinean study
only covers manufacturing firms. Given the nature of these surveys, they are better proxies for formal employment than for
employment as a whole. The data used in these two studies does not capture job creation by new firms, since both panels are based on
a given census of firms, without replacement.
While the estimated job-security elasticity in Argentina is much lower (in absolute value) than the wage elasticity reported in Table
2, in the Peruvian case, this elasticity is larger. This is somewhat surprising since job security reduces job creation and also slows
down employment destruction. Therefore, it might be expected that the JS elasticity would be smaller than the wage elasticity in
absolute value. One explanation for the seemingly high elasticity found in the Peruvian study is that this measure is upwardly biased
by a simultaneity problem arising from the job security measure. Thus, both the Peruvian and the Argentinean studies construct
explicit measures ofjob security based on:
JSj1=4• TJEPJESPJE
Where) is the layoff rate in sectorj in sector t, 1 is average tenure in sectorj, time period t, 1 is the share of firmsin sectorj, time
period t, that are covered by regulations and SP1 is the mandatory severance pay in sectorj, given average tenure 1 This measure
provides variability across sectors and periods, and therefore it affords a more precise estimation of the impact of job security than
before-after types of comparisons. Yet, such measure may also be correlated with the error term in a labor demand equation since the
tenure structure of a firm might be correlated with its employment level. The fact that average layoff rates vary by sector may also
lead to simultaneity if sectors with higher layoffs have lower employment. Thus, periods or sectors with low employment may be
associated with less job creation, high average tenure and, consequently, high measures ofjob security. The Argentinean study shows
that fixing tenure to the period average reduces the estimated elasticity of JS. Thus, a JS elasticity between 1/3 and 2/3 of the wage
elasticity seems a more realistic estimate of its impact.
14Table 2: Summary of existing evidence on the impact of job security (JS) in Latin America
A. Studies that analyze exit rates into and out of employment
Study Country Data Results
Kugler (2000) Colombia Household data Decline in JS leads to reduction in
employment and unemployment duration.
Also hazard rates out of employment and out
of unemployment increase. Some effect due
to temporary contracts but not all
Saavaedra and Torero (2000) Peru Household data Lower JS is associated with lower average
tenure. Higher decline in formal sector.
Hazard rates increase just at the end of
probation period.
P. de Barros and Corseuil (2000)Brazil Employment Surveys, Administrative data and Higher JS associated with a decline in
Household surveys employment exit rates in formal in relation to
informal sector.
Hopenhayn (2000) Argentina Household data Deregulation of temporary contracts leads to
increase in hazard rates in short but not in
long spells
B. Studies that analyze average employment and unemployment
Study Country Data Results
Downes et al. (2000) Barbados Aggregated employment. Annual. It coversNegative effect of JS on labor demand (LD).
large firms (>10 emp) Coeff. Significant at 10%
Saavedra and Torero (2000) Peru Firm and sector-level data. Bimonthy 1986-96. Negative effect of JS on LD when using
Quarterly 1997-98. Formal firms with moresector level-data for whole period. By
than 10 employees. Balanced panel (it doessubperiods, JS has a negative effect from
not account for firm creation or destruction)1987 to 1994, and no effect since then.
Mondino and Montoya (2000) Argentina Panel of manufacturing firms. It does not Negative effect of JS on LD. The coefficient
account for firm creation, in unbalanced panels is slighly more negative
than in balanced ones.
Kugler (2000) Colombia Household data on employment. Decline in JS in 1990 brings a decline in
unemployment rates. Based on computing the
net effect of changes in hazard rates, in and
out of U induced by the reduction in JS.
P. de Barros and Corseuil (2000)Brazil Monthly establishment-level data. 1985-1998 Two step procedure. First, find parameters for
Manufacturing. Firms employing 5 or morelabor demand (LD) function for every month.
workers Then see whether those parameters change
with labor reforms and other development.
They find no effect of JS on LD parameters.
Pages and Montenegro (2000) Chile Household data on employment. Annual Negative but not statistically significant effect
1960-1998 of JS on aggregated employment.
MarquCz (1998) Cross- Cross-section data for Latin America, Rank indicator of Job Security. JS is not
CountryCaribbean and OECD countries, significantly associated with lower
employment once GDP per capita is
accounted for.




Cross-section data for Latin America,
Caribbean and OECD countries,
Self-employment rates are positively
associated with JS even after accounting for
differences in GDP per capita.
Pages and Montenegro (2000) Chile Household Survey Data. 1960-1998 JS is associated with lower employment rates
for young workers and higher employment
rates for older ones. No significant effect on
U for young, middle age or older workers.
15In a very different type of study, Kugler (2000) computes the net impact of the Colombia 1991
labor reform on unemployment rates. Using unemployment and employment exit rate estimates for periods
before and after the reform, she finds that the reforms cause a decline in unemployment between 1.3 and
1.7 percentage points. Thus, as in Mondino and Montoya (2000) and Saavedra and Torero (2000), Kugler's
estimates indicate that the positive impact on the hiring margin outweighs the negative impact on the firing
margin, resulting in a decline in unemployment rates.
Other studies find negative, but not statistically significant, effects of job security on average
employment rates. Pages and Montenegro (1999) find that JS has a negative but not statistically significant
effect on overall wage-employment rates in Chile. Similarly, Marquéz (1998), using a cross-section sample
of Latin American and OECD countries finds a negative but not statistically significant coefficient of job
security on aggregate employment rates. Table 3 summarizes the various estimates of job security on
employment. (The Fleckman and Pages results are discussed below).
Thus, while the theoretical models exhibit some ambiguity regarding the impact of JS provisions
on long-run employment rates, the empirical evidence for LAC is consistent across studies. To
complement these analyses, we examine two other sources of evidence. First, we review the existing
evidence on the impact of JS on employment in OECD countries. Second, in section 4, we provide new
evidence combining employment, unemployment and job security measures from a panel of LAC and
OECD countries.
Table 3: Summary of Long- Run JS Elasticities
Study Mean LE. Employment Rate
Saavedra & Torero (2000) -0.40 6 0.06 Employment in Large firms
Mondino & Montoya (2000)
High estimate** -0.684 0.0 145 Employment in Large firms
Low estimate*** -0.305 0.0060 Employment in Large firms
Pages & Montenegro (1999) -0.1198 0.2440 Wage-Employment/Population
Heckman & Pages (2000), FE* -0.0516 0.0318 Total Employment/Population
Heckman & Pages (2000), RE* -0.0502 0.0 168 Total Employment/population
Heckman & Pages (2000) OLS* -0.0502 0.0 168 Total Employment/population
Notes: *Estimates for LAC only. **Based on Table 9, Mondino & Montoya (2000),
***Based on Table 10, option B. Mondino & Montoya (2000)
16The evidence from OECD countries reinforces the results found for LA. Thus, with the exception
of Anderson (1993), who finds a positive association between dismissal costs and long-mn employment,
the rest of the studies found a negative impact of JS on employment. Using panel data from OECD
countries, Lazear (1990) shows that more stringent job security measures are associated with lower
employment and labor force participation rates. Grubb and Wells (1993) find a negative correlation
between JS and wage-employment rates. Addison and Grosso (1996) reexamine Lazear's estimates using
new measures of job security across countries and find similarly negative effects on employment rates.
Nickell (1997) finds a negative effect of JS provisions on total employment rates and no effect on prime-
age male employment rates. Finally, a recent OECD (2000) study finds a negative but not statistically
significant effect of JS on total employment rates. In contrast, the evidence regarding the effect of JS on
unemployment in OECD countries is ambiguous but there are conceptual reasons for being so. While
Blanchard (1998), Esping-Andersen (forthcoming), Jackman eta!(1996) and Nickell( 1997) among others
find no effect of JS on unemployment, Lazear (1990), Elmeskov eta!(forthcoming) and Scarpetta (1996)
find positive effects. Yet, it should not be a surprise that a negative impact on employment is not
necessarily reflected in a positive effect on unemployment. If workers' participation decisions are
influenced by JS policies (as shown by Lazear, 1990), a reduction in employment will be associated to a
decline in participation rates. This is particularly true for workers with lower attachment to the labor force
or with less access to unemployment insurance benefits.
C. The Composition of Employment
Some recent evidence sheds new light on the possible impact of JS on the composition of
employment in LAC. Marquéz (1998) constructs a JS indicator for LAC and OECD countries and uses it
to estimate the effects of JS on the formal/informal distribution of employment. Re finds that more
stringent JS provisions are associated with a larger percentage of self-employed workers. In a study of
Chile, Pages and Montenegro (2000) find that more stringent job security is associated with a substantial
decline in the wage employment-to-population rates of young workers and an increase in the wage-
employment rates of older workers. Their results also suggest that this composition effect is driven by the
17high costs of dismissing older workers relative to younger ones created by job security provisions related to
tenure.
4. New Evidence
In this section, we exploit substantial cross-country and time series variability in job security
provisions to estimate whether the negative effects of JS encountered in some of the individual-country
studies in LAC generalize to a wider sample of countries and reforms.
A. The Data
We construct a data set that spans industrial and LAC countries. To do so we proceed in two stages.
We first collect employment and unemployment data for industrial countries from the OECD statistics.
Second, we use the OECD definitions of these variables, to construct the same indicators out of Latin
American Household Surveys. Table 4 provides summary statistics for the overall sample, the OECD
sample (excluding Mexico, which is included in the LAC sample) and the LAC sample. Table 5describes
the household surveys used to compute the LAC variables. Finally, to characterize job security, we use the
index ofjob security described in section 2.
The number of countries and the average number of observations per country in our sample varies
between 36 and 43 countries and between 1 and 5observationsper country, respectively. Among the
countries represented, around 28 belong to the sample of OECD countries, while 15 are from the LAC
region. Regarding the period spanned in our sample, for most LAC countries, there are one or two
observations from the eighties and one or two from the nineties. The OECD sample only covers the
nineties. In relation to the variables used in this exercise, it should be noted that all employment rates are
measured as a percentage of working age population and all unemployment rates as a percentage of active
economic population (See the Appendix for a definition of the variables used in this study)
Table 4 shows some remarkable differences between the OECD and the LAC samples. As noted in
section 2, average job security is higher in Latin America and the Caribbean than in OECD countries. In
contrast, all employment rates (except for prime-age female employment) are higher and all unemployment
rates are lower in the LAC region than in industrial countries. Especially notable are the higher share of
18self-employment and the much lower share of long-term unemployment (more than 6 months) in LAC.
Finally, union density and female participation are both lower in the LAC region.
B. Methodology and Results
By constructing our own data set from individual household-level surveys, we are guaranteed that
all the labor market variables are comparable and reliable. One drawback of our data is that we only have a
few time series observations per country (usually three or four), and not necessarily from consecutive years.
Given the nature of the data, we decided not to average observations from a given period —as done in most
of the OECD studies on job security—and instead control for the state of the business cycle in a given year
using GDP growth.
We use a reduced form approach to investigate whether countries and periods with more strict job
security regulations are associated with lower employment or higher unemployment rates. Thus we
estimate an average net effect of JS as it operates through intermediate variables which we do not include
in the regression. In this paper, we do not estimate the theoretically more appropriate state-contingent
demand functions because we lack the information on the states of demand confronting individual firms. JS
costs govern the marginal costs of labor when firms are firing, but they also affect overall labor demand
through their effect on expected (across states) labor cost. It is the latter effect that we attempt to identify.
Since most of the variation is cross-sectional, we use different types of variables to control for country-
specific factors that may be correlated with job security. First, we use demographic controls such as the
share of the population between 15 and 24 and female participation rates. These variables account for the
fact that high job security countries in the south of Europe and Latin America tend to have low female
participation and a large share of youth population. Since both factors affect overall employment rates, not
including them in the specification may lead to substantial biases in the estimates. We protect against
common country-specific unobservables that remain constant over time and that may affect both left hand
side and right hand side variables by including country-specific fixed effects in a set of regression
specifications reported below. Second, we use GDP (measured in 1995 U.S. dollars) to control for
19differences in development levels across countries. We also include a dummy variable for LAC to control
for regional differences not controlled by GDP levels14.
Most of the variability in our sample comes from differences across countries and regions, and
from some time series variance within the LAC sample. There is very little time-series variability in the
OECD sub-sample. Given this variation, fixed effects (FE) estimates are likely to be very imprecise
because they only use the time-series variation within the LAC sample. Instead, random effects (RE) or
pooled OLS estimates, that use both the cross-section and the time-series variation included in the sample,
are likely to produce estimates with smaller standard errors. Yet, the latter estimates will be biased if
variables included as controls are correlated with country specific error terms. To protect against the bias
that results from using one estimator, we estimate our basic specification by pooled OLS, RE and FE,
comparing whether these different methodologies yield similar point-estimates.
The results, presented in Tables 6.a to 6.c, are striking.First, the point-estimates for the JS
coefficient in the total employment specifications are very similar across estimation methodologies. The
three estimates suggest a large negative effect of JS on employment rates. This effect is strongly
statistically significant in the OLS and the RE estimates while it is not statistically significant, at
conventional levels, in the FE case. One obvious advantage of using a cardinal measure of JS is that we can
quantifj the impact of these provisions on employment. The magnitudes of JS elasticities are quite large:
an increase in expected dismissal costs equivalent to one month of pay is associated with a 1.8 percentage
points decline in employment rates. Given that in Latin America the average dismissal cost in 2000 was
3.04 months (See Graph 1), the estimated loss in employment —as a percent of total working population--
due to JS provisions is about 5.5percentagepoints.
In addition, OLS, FE and RE estimates suggest that JS does not affect the employment rates of all
workers in the same fashion. Thus, while the impact on prime-age male employment rates is half the impact
on total employment, the impact on young workers' employment rates is almost two times larger. The
magnitudes are huge. The OLS and the RE estimates suggest that JS reduces LAC youth employment rates
by almost 10 percentage points. This effect is even larger in the FE estimates. Moreover, these magnitudes
are consistent with the ones obtained in Pages and Montenegro (1999) for Chile.
14 These specifications should include a measure of labor costs that includewages and other non-wage labor costs. Unfortunately, a
20Our estimates of the effect of JS on female employment rates, self-employment and
unemployment rates are less consistent. The point estimates for female employment rates change from
negative to positive across methodologies, but in no case are the estimates statistically significant. These
results suggest that women are less negatively affected by JS than men but, as we will show, these results
are not robust across regional sub-samples.
The estimates of the effect of JS on self-employment also change signs across OLS, FE and RE
estimates. Thus, while the pooled estimates suggest a positive and statistically significant association
between the strength of JS provisions and self-employment (as found by Marquéz (1998)), the FE estimates
show a negative and also statistically significant relationship between both variables. It is clear that more
empirical work is required to reach a definitive conclusion on the relationship between JS and self-
employment.
Finally, the empirical results on unemployment also greatly depend on the methodology used to
estimate the parameters. While OLS and RE yield positive (and often statistically significant) coefficients
on JS in all the unemployment specifications, FE yields negative and statistically insignificant results. We
do not find a significant relationship between the proportion of workers unemployed for more than 6
months and the strictness of JS provisions. Since there is no a priori relationship between disemployment
and unemployment, these results are not surprising, especially given differences across regions in the levels
of social insurance.
Divergence across estimation methods may result from regional differences in the relationship
between JS and some of the variables. This is particularly relevant for our exercise since FE estimates
discard practically all of the information for OECD countries. We therefore investigate whether our results
are driven by any of the two sub-samples, by estimating separate coefficients for LAC and OECD
countries. The results from this exercise are presented in Table 7. While this approach results in small
samples and lower statistical significance, the results are still quite remarkable. First, in all the employment
specifications, with the exception of female employment rates, the coefficients on job security are negative
across regions and estimation methods. In addition, most of the coefficients are highly statistically
significant.
complete and comparable measure of labor costs across countries and time is not available.
21Second, with one exception, all coefficients of the effect of job security on unemployment rates
are positive both in OECD and in LAC countries. However, the impact on unemployment rates seems
much larger in the industrial country sub-sample, in particular for women and youth. It should not come as
a surprise that the effect of JS on unemployment rates is smaller in developing countries. In the absence of
unemployment insurance or other income support programs, workers either quickly find other (less
attractive jobs) or drop out of the labor force.15 The positive and statistically coefficient of GDP level in
the unemployment regressions reported in Tables 6a-6c confirms this effect.
Third, the ranking of effects between total, male and young workers employment rates is
preserved. The point estimates tend to be larger (in absolute value) in the LAC sample. It is very likely that
the higher level and variability of JS in this region contributes to these larger (in absolute value) point
estimates. It is quite puzzling, however, that the estimates for female employment (and unemployment)
rates are so different across regions. Thus, while, JS is negatively associated with female employment rates
in the OECD sub-sample, this relationship is actually positive in the LAC sample. The added worker effect
is more evident in LAC, where adult female attachment to the labor force is still weak. Understanding
gender differences in the impact of JS remains one important issue for further research.
Finally, the evidence of the impact of job security on the formal/informal composition of
employment is not conclusive. A comparison of our estimates for LAC with the elasticities obtained from
the individual-country studies (see table 3), suggest that the decline in employment associated with JS is
greater in the covered (formal) sectors--such as the manufacturing sector or sectors with large-firms--than
in the aggregate.16 This would imply that an increase in job security is associated with a decline in formal
employment and an increase—although not enough to compensate the decline in formal jobs—in informal
employment. However, the estimates for self-employment—usually considered part of the informal
employment--in Table 7 Panel A, indicate an unstable effect of JS on self-employment. While the
coefficient resulting from OLS estimation is positive and significant, the coefficient resulting from fixed
effect estimation is negative and statistically significant. More research is necessary to understand the
relationship between uncovered employment and job security in Latin America.
In the case of Chile, Montenegro and Pages (1999) found that the large effects of JS on youth employment rates were compensated
with a large decline in participation rates with no significant effects on unemployment.
16TheHeckman and Pages elasticities, reported in Table 3, are obtained from a model identical to the one reported in Table 6, but
where job security provisions enter the specification in logs.
225. Conclusions
In a recent article, Freeman (2000) writes that "the institutional organization of the labour market
has identifiable large effects on distribution, but modest hard-to-uncover effects on efficiency." This view
is shared by many economists (see Abraham and T4ouseman (1994) and Blank and Freeman (1994)).
However, the results summarized in this paper suggest that job security regulations have a substantial
impact on employment and turnover rates both in Latin America and in OCED countries and thus
substantially affect the efficiency of the labor market.
The assertion that job security does not have any impact on employment rates is based on evidence
on unemployment, not on employment. However, employment and unemployment are not minor images of
each other. In addition, while there is substantial evidence that unions reduce earnings inequality in
industrial countries, there is no evidence that job security provisions reduce income inequality. Indeed,
given that job security reduces the employment prospects (and possibly wages) of younger and less
experienced workers, who bear the brunt of regulation, it is likely that regulation widens earnings
inequality across age groups. Thus, there is no trade off between employment and inequality associated
with job security provisions. Such provisions worsen both. The choice of labor market institutions matters.
What policy lessons can be drawn from these results? Our evidence suggests that job security
provisions are an extremely inefficient and inequality-increasing mechanism for providing income security
to workers. They are inefficient because they reduce the demand for labor; they are inequality-increasing
because some workers benefit while many others are hurt. Their impact on inequality is multifaceted: Job
security increases inequality because it reduces the employment prospects of young, female and unskilled
workers. It also increases inequality because it segregates the labor market between workers with secure
jobs and workers with very few prospects of becoming employed. Finally, job security provisions increase
inequality if, as predicted by some theoretical studies and most of the available empirical evidence, they
increase the size of the informal sector.
In this light, it seems reasonable to advocate the substitution of job security provisions by other
mechanisms that provide income security at lower efficiency and inequality costs. However, reducing
dismissal costs is a difficult policy to implement in most countries. The persistence of these policies can be
23explained by a demand for income security for groups with political power (Caballero and T4ammour,
2000). A demand for income security arises because job security lowers flows out of unemployment and
into employment. Although job security reduces the probability of exiting employment, conditional on
having lost a job, the probability of finding a new one is reduced. This produces a sense of insecurity
among protected workers, who exert pressure to maintain high levels ofjob security provisions. A balance
of power that favors insider workers helps to sustain job security provisions. Thus, those workers most
likely to benefit from such provisions are also more likely to be represented in the political process. Instead,
outsider workers are less likely to influence policy. Reform minded policymakers should pursue broad
coalitions including representatives of outsider workers--such as young, female, unemployed or
discouraged workers-- to obtain support for labor market reforms.
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26Appendix
Construction of the index of job security
The job security index is constructed according to the following formula:
Index = $S'(1 S)(b+1 + aSP+( + (1— a)S1)
where j denotes country, S is the probability of remaining in a job, f3 is the discount factor, T is the
maximum tenure that a worker can attain in a firm, b1,+1 is the advance notice to a worker that has been i
years at a firm, a is the probability that the economic difficulties of the firm are considered a justified cause
of dismissal, SP( is the mandated severance pay in such event to a worker that has been i years at the firm,
and finally, SP+fc denotes the payment to be awarded to a worker with tenure i in case of unjustified
dismissal. 17
The constructed index measures the expected discounted cost, at the time a worker is hired, of
dismissing a worker in the future. The assumption is that firms evaluate future costs based on current labor
law. The index only includes statutory provisions, and thus, it does not include provisions negotiated in
collective bargaining or included in company policy manuals. It addition, it does not include dismissal
costs that are ruled by a judge if a firm is taken to courts. This assumption explains why dismissal costs—
according to our index—are zero in the U.S., despite the substantial potential costs associated with legal
actions. High values of the index indicate periods or countries of high job security, whereas lower values
characterize periods or countries in which dismissal costs are lower. By construction, this index gives
equal weight to notice periods and to severance pay since both are added up in the calculation of the
dismissal costs. This index however gives a higher weight to dismissal costs that may arise soon after a
worker is hired--since they are less discounted at the time of hiring-- while it discounts firing costs that may
arise further in the future.
In computing the index, we assumed a common discount rate and a common turnover rate of 8%
and 12%, respectively. The choice of the discount rate is based on the average return of an internationally
diversified portfolio. Finally, the choice of turnover rate is based on the fact that real turnover rates are
27unobservable in countries with job security provisions since the turnover rate, is itself affected by job
security. We therefore choose to input all countries with the observed turnover rates in the U.S., the country
in the sample with the lowest job security. The minimum tenure at a firm is considered to be one year, and
the maximum is assumed to be twenty years.
We compute SPJC and SPJUCbasedon the two different sources. For LAC countries, we use the
legal information summarized in Table 1 .A. This information was directly obtained from the Ministries of
Labor of the region. In the case of Colombia we consider that severance payment prior to the 1990 reform
was one month and V2 per year of work instead of one--as prescribed by law--to include that prior to the
1990 reform, advance withdrawals to the seniority premium fund were accounted in nominal terms. High
inflation rates implied that this practice substantially increased overall dismissal costs. For OECD
countries, we use the legal information summarized in OECD (1999). In all Latin American countries but
Argentina and Chile, economic conditions are not a just cause for dismissal. Consequently, we assumed
a=O for those countries. Instead, in Argentina, Chile, economic conditions were a justified cause of
dismissal and therefore, a=1. For OECD countries, we used the information summarized in Table 2.A.2
OECD (1999) to parameterize severance payments and advance notice. In all cases, but in Spain, a =1.In
Spain, mandatory severance pay in the case of unjustified cause was substantially larger than severance pay
for just cause. Consequently most workers fired for just cause appealed to the courts, and there was a high
probability that a judge would declare a dismissal unjustified. Based on Bertola, Boeri and Cazes (2000),
we assume that prior to the 1997 reform, a=0.2. After 1997, the scope for ambiguity was reduced and
a=0.5. For Canada, we used the information relevant to the federal jurisdiction (although JS provisions
may vary across states). Finally, in some European countries statutory dismissal costs vary across blue and
white-collar workers. To obtain a single measure per country, we compute a separated index for blue and
white-collar workers and performed a simple average among the two. (See OECD, 1999 for a description
of dismissal costs in OECD countries and the cost divergences between blue-and white-collar workers.)
28Definition of Variables used in Empirical Section
Total Employment. All employed workers between 16 and 65 that declared having a job in the week of
reference. It is measured as % of total population 16-65. All measures of aggregate employment include
formal and informal workers. They also include unpaid workers. Source: OECD statistics and LAC
household Surveys.
Prime Age-Male Employment: % of men 25-50 years old employed in the week of reference. Source:
OECD statistics and LAC household Surveys.
Prime Age-Female Employment: % of female 25-50 years old employed in the week of reference.
Source: OECD statistics and LAC household Surveys.
Youth Employment: % of people 16-24 years old employed in the week of reference. Source: OECD
statistics and LAC household Surveys.
Self-Employment: Share of non-agricultural workers in self-employment or as owners of firms. Source:
Maloney (1999)
Total Unemployment: # of people 16-65 that did not work in the week of reference but are actively
looking for a job as a % of total active population in that age group. Source: OECD statistics and LAC
household Surveys.
Prime-Age Male Unemployment: # of men 25-50 that did not work in the week of reference but are
actively looking for a job as a % of male active population in that age group. Source: OECD statistics and
LAC household Surveys.
Prime-Age Female Unemployment: # of people 25-50 that did not work in the week of reference but are
actively looking for a job as a % of female active population in that age group. Source: OECD statistics and
LAC household Surveys.
Youth Unemployment: # of people 16-24 that did not work in the week of reference but are actively
looking for a job as a % of active population in that age group. Source: OECD statistics and LAC
household Surveys.
29Long-term nnemployment: # of people 16-65 that have been without a job, and actively looking for one
for more than 6 months as a % of total active population in that age group. Source: OECD statistics and
LAC household Surveys.
Female Participation: % of total female workers 16-65 that are either employed or actively seeking one.
Source: OECD statistics and LAC household Surveys.
GDP: Gross Domestic Product measured in 1995 US dollars. Source: World Bank.
Population 15-24: Proportion of population in this age group. Source: UN Population Statistics
30Table 1.A: Legislation Concerning Conditions of Dismissal in 1990 and 1999. X=monthly wages, N=Years of Tenure
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Table 4: Summary Statistics
Avenge Statistics for the overall sample
Variable Observations # countries # per country Mean Std. Dcv.
Total Employment 221 43 5.1 66.09 8.44
Prime-Age Male Employment 139 43 3.2 89.19 4.93
Prime-Age Female Employment 139 43 3.2 56.88 14.85
Youth (15-24) Employment 140 43 3.3 53.05 15.47
Self-employment 84 40 2.1 26.92 11.87
Total Unemployment 221 43 5.1 8.01 4.15
Prime-Age Male Unemployment 221 43 5.1 8.01 4.15
Prime-Age Female Unemployment 139 43 3.2 4.99 3.09
Youth (15-24) Unemployment 139 43 3.2 6.25 4.39
Unemployed> 6months/Total U. 140 40 3.5 13.42 7.71
Job Security 205 36 5.7 2.62 1.74
GDP(US dollars 1995) 212 42 5.0 5.E+11 9.E+11
GDP growth 179 41 4.4 2.90 3.30
Proportionpoplsto24 221 43 5.1 0.16 0.03
Female Participation 221 43 5.1 55.64 13.34
Union density 47 39 1.2 26.52 17.79
Average Statistics for Latin America and the Caribbean
Variable Observations # countries # per country Mean Std. Dcv.
Total Employment 59 15 3.93 7 1.950 4.222
Prime-Age Male Employment 59 15 3.93 91.746 3.157
Prime-Age Female Employment 59 15 3.93 47.191 10.699
Youth (15-24) Employment 59 15 3.93 63.662 11.078
Self-employment 59 15 3.93 32.742 8.269
Total Unemployment 59 15 3.93 7.404 3.296
Prime-Age Male Unemployment 59 15 3.93 3.881 2.578
Prime-Age Female Unemployment 59 15 3.93 4.666 3.134
Youth (15-24) Unemployment 59 15 3.93 10.881 4.670
Unemployed> 6months/Total U. 42 15 3.93 14.548 7.262
Job Security 108 16 2.69 3.512 1.567
GDP(US dollars 1995) 66 20 5 1.24E+11 1.99E+11
GDP growth 59 17 3.88 3.3 12 3.837
Proportionpoplsto24 71 17 3.47 0.197 0.016
FemaleParticipation 59 18 3.94 44.255 10.526
Uniondensity 21 17 1.23 18 11.37
Average Statistics for OECD Sample (Excluding Mexico)
Observations # countries # per country Mean Std. Dcv.
Total Employment 162 28 5.79 63.96 8.59
Prime-Age Male Employment 80 28 2.86 87.31 5.16
Prime-Age Female Employment 80 28 2.86 64.02 13.39
Youth (15-24) Employment 81 28 2.89 45.33 13.54
Self-employment 25 25 1.00 13.17 6.47
Total Unemployment 162 28 5.79 8.22 4.41
Prime-Age Male Unemployment 162 28 5.79 8.22 4.41
Prime-Age Female Unemployment 80 28 2.86 5.80 3.19
Youth (15-24) Unemployment 80 28 2.86 7.43 4.81
Unemployed> 6months/Total U. 81 24 3.38 15.28 8.90
Job Security 97 16 6.06 1.63 1.36
GDP(US dollars 1995) 146 25 5.84 6.25E+11 1.07E+12
GDP growth 120 24 5.00 2.70 3.00
Proportionpoplsto24 150 25 6.00 0.15 0.02
Female Participation 162 28 5.79 59.79 11.77
Union density 26 22 1.18 33.43 19.1896 Encuesta Nacional de Empleo
97 Encuesta Nacional de Empleo
81 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios
83 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios
86 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios
88 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios
92 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios
93 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios
95 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios
96 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios
87 Encuesta de Caracterizaciôn Socioeconômica Nacional
98 Encuesta de Caracterizaciôn Socioeconômica Nacional
92 Encuesta de Caracterizaciôn Socioeconômica Nacional
94 Encuesta de Caracterizaciôn Socioeconômica Nacional
96 Encuesta de Caracterizaciôn Socioeconômica Nacional
95 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares -Fuerzade Trabajo
97 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares -Fuerzade Trabajo
81 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares -Empleoy Desempleo
83 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares -Empleoy Desempleo
85 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares -Empleoy Desempleo
87 Encuesta de Hogares de Propôsitos Multiples
89 Encuesta de Hogares de Propôsitos Multiples
91 Encuesta de Hogares de Propôsitos Multiples
93 Encuesta de Hogares de Propôsitos Multiples
95 Encuesta de Hogares de Propôsitos Multiples
97 Encuesta de Hogares de Propôsitos Multiples
96 Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo
95 Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida
95 Encuesta de Hogares de Propôsitos Multiples
89 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propôsitos Multiples
92 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propôsitos Multiples
96 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propôsitos Multiples
98 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propôsitos Multiples
84 Encuesta Nacional de lngreso Gasto de los Hogares
89 Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso Gasto de los Hogares
92 Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso Gasto de los Hogares
94 Encuesta Nacional de lngreso Gasto de los Hogares
96 Encuesta Nacional de lngreso Gasto de los Hogares
93 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares Sobre Medicion de Niveles de Vida
79 Encuesta Continua de Hogares -Manode Obra
91 Encuesta Continua de Hogares -Manode Obra
95 Encuesta Continua de Hogares
97 Encuesta de Hogares
95 Encuesta de Hogares -Manode Obra
85-86Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Mediciôn de Niveles de Vida
91 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Mediciôn de Niveles de Vida
94 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Mediciôn de Niveles de Vida
96 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Niveles de Vida y Pobreza
97 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Niveles de Vida y Pobreza
81 Encuesta de Hogares por Muestra
86 Encuesta de Hogares por Muestra
89 Encuesta de Hogares por Muestra
93 Encuesta de Hogares por Muestra
95 Encuesta de Hogares por Muestra









Table 5: Description of Household Surveys
Country Year Name of the survey Sample size Month when
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36Table 6.a: OLS Estimation. Full Sample
Total Male Female Youth Self- Total Male Female Youth Proportion
Prime-age Prime-age Prime-age Prime-age of Unemp.
Emp. Emp. Emp. Emp. EmpI.Unemployment Unemployment Unemployment Unemployment >6 months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
LAC 16.04*fl 47Ø*** -1137 2847 11.67*** _2.12** _2.75*** _4.23*** _7.16*** _4414***
(133) (91) (322) (329) (321) (115) (70) (111) (257) (376)
JobSecurity _1.37*** _0.81*** -146 _354*** 1.37** 0.83*fl .87*** .833*** .87* .86
(32) (258) (90) (3.97) (58) (28) (19) (31) (.53) (89)
GDP growth -108 -005 -0124 008 .50** 006 -004 10 0083 -016
(133) (.110) (387) (36) (23) (.116) (08) (13) (21) (036)
GDP level _3E_12***-1.97E-122.45E-12-3.5E-12-3.OIE-12 3.51E-12 2.91E_12*** 3.6E_11** 2.55E-12 6.71E_12*
(1.28e-12)(1 .39e-12) (4.86e-12) (4.58e-12)(3.33e-12) (1.1 le-12) (1.06e-12) (1 .68e-1 1) (2.69e-12) (3.88e-12)
Female part. Ø399*** - - 334*** .240*** _.108*** - - -.186 _.65***
(0.047) (.12) (.084) (.04) (.078) (0.14)
Pop 15to24 1156 - - - 115.26** 34.49 - - -69.89 -96.57
(27.08) (52.12) (23.53) (48.85) (17.28)
Constant 41.63***89.95***62.81***33.19*** -1935 1743 3.24*** 509 36.21** 104.7***
(5.21) (1.21) (4.27) (8.32) (10.59) (5.07) (.93) (1.47) (10.12) (17.25)
N. observations 114 77 77 78 65 114 77 77 78 64
R-square 073 033 029 053 057 023 032 026 030 85
Notes: Standard errors reported within parenthesis. *indicatessignificant at 10, **significantat 5% and ***significantat 1%
Table 6.b: Random—Effects (RE) Estimation. Full Sample
Total Male Female Youth Self- Total Male Female Youth Proportion
Prime-age Prime-age Prime-age Prime-age of Unemp.
Emp. Emp. Emp. Emp. EmpI.Unemployment Unemployment Unemployment Unemployment >6 months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
LAC 15.26*** 4.62** -11.05"29.99*** 14.56*** -2.24 _2.36* -3.79 -7.29 _48.61***
(2.15) (1.82) (5.47) (5.23) (3.90) (1.93) 1.26 (1.92) (3.81) (6.35)
Job Security -1 .84***1 .04" 526 _3.28*** .35 .69 77** 1.06** .99 .95
(505) (.48) (1.33) (1.38) (.87) (.45) (.34) (.515) (.86) (1.49)
GDP growth -0.001 .054 .218 0.164 393*** -.04 .016 .12 -.084 -0.171
(.073) (.091) (.199) (.278) (.166) (.06) (.07) (.09) .135 (.246)
GDP level -4.14E-12-2.68E-12 1.31E_11* -7.18E-12 -5.36E-12 4.23E_11* 3.13E_12* 4.72E_12* -5.36E-12 9.49E-12
(2.51e-12)(2.42e-12) (7.03e-12) (6.87e-12)(4.39e-12) (2.24e-12) (1.71e-12) (2.57e-12) (4.39e-12) (6.80e-12)
Female part. 0.33*** - - 0.63*** .036 .021 - - .037 _.304*
(0047) (13) (08) (04) 077 (161)
Pop 15to24 316 - - - 40.22 29.98 - - 41.98 115.79
(26.84) (54.40) (25.22) (46.25) (115.28)
Constant 4777***90.37***54.06*** 16.80* 6.95 .53 3.36** 4.23** 4.95 50.7"
(5.74) (1.89) (5.34) (9.43) (11.13) (5.38) (1.36) (2.01) (9.81) (22.22)
N. observations 114 77 77 78 65 114 77 77 78 64
R-square 0.72 .32 .23 0.50 .57 .13 .31 .25 .17 0.82
HausmanTest 5.46 3.90 2.17 9.43 53.56 9.53 4.87 3.75 8.78 8.06
(.36) (.27) (.57) (0.05) (0.00) (0.08) (.18) (.28) (.11) (.15)
Notes: Standard errors reported within parenthesis. *indicatessignificant at 10, **significantat 5% and ***significantat I %.
37Table 6.c : Fixed —Effects (FE) Estimation. Full Sample
Total Male Female Youth Self- Total Male Female Youth Proportion
Prime-age Prime-age Prime-age Prime-age of Unemp.
Emp. Emp. Emp. Emp. EmpI.Unemployment Unemployment Unemployment Unemployment >6 months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
JobSecurity -155 -0.013 327 _6.04* _8.43*** -187 -106 0021 -116 151
(107) (1183) (229) (3.55) (173) (.99) (96) (128) (162) (464)
GDP growth 0049 143 145 278 111 -009 -005 0024 .25* -017
(078) (101) (19) (303) (150) (07) (08) (.11) (13) (28)
GDPlevel -1.92E-11_2E_11*** 5.5E_11** _6.7E_11** -3.01E-12 1.6E_11*** 2.IE_11*** 2.4E_11** 3.9E_11*** 3.90E-11
(8.84e-12)(9.97e-12) (1 .93e-1 1) (3.25e-1 1)(3.74e-12) (8.le-12) (8.15e-12) (1 .08e-1 1) (1.48e-12) (4.55e-1 1)
Female part. Ø34*** - - 1.00*fl 240 07 - - 08 -07
(005) (19) (104) (05) (09) (23)
Pop 15to24 -5.93 - - - 11526 5603* - - 6071 529.05**
(3120) (5113) (2863) (4910) (21891)
Constant 59.67***9594***27.14***42.15*** -1935 -905 300 -008 _7.12** _63.79***
(721) (3.37) (654) (1135) (1037) (662) (276) (366) (1163) (45.53)
N. observations 114 77 77 78 65 114 77 77 78 64
N. countries 28 28 28 28 27 28 28 28 28 25
R-square 009 005 005 003 030 003 003 008 001 004
Notes: Standard errors reported within parenthesis. *indicatessignificant at 10, **significantat 5% and ***significantat 1%
Table 7: The impact of job security in the regional sub-samples
A. Latin America and the Caribbean
Dependent Variable II Ohs. OLS OLS RE RE FE FE
CoefficientSE.Coefficient S.E CoefficientSE.
TotalEmployment 53_9*** (0.36)_1.62*** (0.59) -1.83 (1.34)
Maleprime-ageEmployment 53 _Ø3*** (0.30) _1.44** (0.58) -0.48 (1.24)
Femaleprime-ageEmployment 53 0.78 (1.11) 3.15** (1.52) 3.10 (2.59)
YouthEmployment 53 4.21fhc (0.94)_433*** (1.30) _75Ø* (3.70)
Self-employment 53 1.09* (0.63) -0.58 (0.98) _8.34*** (1.73)
TotalUnemployment 53 0.34 (0.35) .06 (0.04) 0.13 (1.26)
Maleprime-age Unemp. 53 Ø94*** (0.24)0.91*** (0.43) -0.74 (1.02)
FemalePrime-ageUnemp. 53 0.27 (0.33) 0.51 (0.52) 0.06 (1.42)
YouthUnemployment 53 0.35 (0.47) -0.22 (1.60) -0.22 (1.60)
%Long-termUnemp. 30 0.13 (0.98) -0.11 (1.36) 0.42 (5.31)
B. OECDCountries (Excluding Mexico)
Dependent Variable II Ohs.. OLS OLS RE RE FE FE
CoefficientSE. CoefficientSE. CoefficientSE.
TotalEmployment 61 -0.82 (0.57) _33Ø*** (1.16) - -
Maleprime-ageEmployment 24 -0.06 (0.66) -0.07 (1.13) - -
Femaleprime-ageEmployment 24 _5.80***(1.69) _6.16*** (2.38) - -
YouthEmployment 25 1.32 (2.81) -4.41 (4.58) - -
Self-employment Not enough observations
TotalUnemployment 61 1.14** (.56) 2.27** (1.10) - -
Maleprime-age Unemp. 24 0.50 (0.49) 0.48 (0.77) - -
FemalePrime-ageUnemp. 24 2.23*** (0.85) 2.04* (1.19) - -
YouthUnemployment 25 .586 (1.98) 470* (2.93) - -
%Long-termUnemp. 35 2.003 (1.85) 3.31 (3.62) - -
Note:standard errors between parenthesis. The specifications for the two sub-samples include the same repressors than in the overall sample.
*indicatessignificant at 10, **significantat 5% and ***significantat 1%.
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